Review of Mann

Mann’s overwhelming analytical strength is in his command of his historical cases and his ability to correlate the various types of violence he studies with the social conditions under which they are produced. The book, in my opinion, is likely to be the finest in the set that I’m reading. His cases are what as a debater I was trained to call prima facie cases—cases that from the standpoint of rhetoric are well constructed, cases that at “face value” must stand. If you are to debate Mann’s argument, your major recourse is to return and review the secondary historical texts on which he draws and criticize his cases and argument on the basis of flaws in evidence that you may uncover. If you accept his internal evidence, and at face value, I see no reason to doubt his honesty and thoroughness, the construction of each case is sound, logical, balanced and thorough. He is also a clear writer and, alone among the writers on violence, offers sober and realistic assessments of what interested agents might do to stop ethnic cleansing. I wouldn’t hesitate to assign any part of this book for student reading. Certainly the other authors in the set will have to go to great lengths in order to beat Mann. I admire the book a great deal.

The only weakness I can find is that, by and large, he omits coverage of the psychological literature on violence. I see his argument is more concerned with correlating social structures with violence, rather than understanding why those structures are able to cause the corresponding violence. In all fairness, I believe he would debate this criticism. Without a doubt, I believe he is correct that ethnic cleansing is a modern phenomenon and that the social conditions he describes are strongly correlated with ethnic cleansing. That said, I hold that without understanding the psychology of the rhetoric needed to create and coordinate mass violence, the actual causes of the violence will elude us. Moreover, Mann’s central thesis that ethnic cleansing is the “dark side of democracy” cannot be developed as a critique of liberalism without analyzing the integrating the genuine impact of the ingroup-outgroup distinction on democratic practice.

Mann’s Theses

Mann’s theory takes the form of general predictive hypotheses about ethnic cleansing when it occurs. These are reproduced below:

Thesis 1: Murderous cleansing is the dark side of democracy

This first thesis contains several sub-theses:

Thesis 1a: Murderous ethnic cleansing is a hazard of the age of democracy since amid multiethnicity the ideal of rule by the people began to entwine the demos with the dominant ethnos, generating organic conceptions of the state that encouraged the cleansing of minorities.

Thesis 1b: In modern colonies, settler democracies in certain contexts have been truly murderous, more so than authoritarian colonial governments. The more settlers controlled colonial institutions, the more murderous the cleansing.

Thesis 1c: Regimes newly embarked upon democratization are more likely to commit murderous ethnic cleansing than are stable authoritarian regimes.

Thesis 1d: Stably institutionalized democracies are less likely than either democratizing or authoritarian regimes to commit murderous cleansing.

Thesis 1e: Regimes that are actually perpetrating murderous cleansing are never democratic. Apply these theses beforehand to monitor the state as it becomes less democratic.

The other theses are more simple:

Thesis 2: Ethnic hostility rises where ethnicity trumps class as the main form of social stratification, in the process capturing and channeling classlike sentiments toward ethnonationalism.

Thesis 3: The danger zone of murderous cleansing is reached when (1) movements claiming to represent two fairly old ethnic groups both lay claim to their own state over all or part of the same territory and (2) this claim seems to have substantial legitimacy and some plausible chance of being implemented.

Thesis 4: The brink of murderous cleansing is reached when one of the two alternative scenarios play out: (1) The less powerful side is bolstered to fight rather than to submit (for submission reduces the deadliness of the conflict) by believing that aid will be forthcoming from the outside or (2) the stronger side believes that it has such overwhelming military power and ideological legitimacy that it can force through it own cleansed state at little physical or moral risk to itself.

Thesis 5: Going over the brink into the perpetration of murderous cleansing occurs where the state exercising sovereignty over the contested territory has been factionalized and radicalized amid an unstable geopolitical environment that usually leads to war (political instability is required).

Thesis 6: Murderous cleansing is rarely the original intent of perpetrators.

Thesis 7: There are three main levels of perpetrator. These are: (a) radical elites running party states, (b) bands of militants forming violent paramilitaries, (c) core constituencies providing mass though not majority popular support.

Thesis 8: Ordinary people are brought by normal social structures into committing murderous ethnic cleansing and their motives are much more mundane.

Mann is not pursuing a generalized theory. He argues, “Given the messiness and uniqueness of societies, my theses cannot be scientific laws. They do not even fit perfectly to my case studies.” He sums up his position as follows:

Murderous cleansing is most likely to result where powerful groups within two ethnic groups aim at legitimate and rival states “in the name of the people” over the same territory, and the weaker is aided from the outside. It worsens in the presence of unstable, factionalized party-states. That is the main argument of this book, and it indicates that in explaining this particularly vicious area of human behavior, political power relations are ultimately decisive.

His claim that, “All my cases have peculiarities that I must respect,” is the mark of a good historian, a claim for which, in turn, I have a good measure of respect. Certainly the book is a testament to Mann’s scholarly thoroughness. That said, I am not convinced that a theory of ethnic cleansing cannot be causal, rather than descriptive.

Critique of the Causal Model

While Mann openly stresses that leader decisions are critical causes of ethnic cleansing, he does very little actual theorization the role of agents in his book. His method consists of reviewing the historical narrative of several ethnic cleansings to determine common social conditions that precede ethnic cleansing. This analysis is valuable, but not complete. I believe that psychological insight, specifically a deeper knowledge of how the ingroup-outgroup distinction is activated at times of threat would help make his collection of theses into a more parsimonious and compact theory.

Let’s spend a moment on thesis one. Mann believes that, ironically, given the literature on the democratic peace in international relations and a general belief that liberalism is the panacea for all intolerance, it seems that democracy, particularly weak, unconsolidated democracy, actually seems to be a critical component in the causality of many cleansings. I am more than delighted to grant this. That said, the reasons why this is so are unclear and the effect appears highly inconsistent.

For example, thesis 1a tells us that people have a tendency to confuse the ethnos (an ethnic, organic notion of the people that indicates that the community shares “a common culture and sense of heritage, distinct from other peoples,” (Mann, p. 3) with the demos, a view of the population that sees the community as “the ordinary people” (Mann, p. 3), by which, as far as I can tell, means that it is a collection or more or less atomized individuals who live in a given space. An important characteristic of the common identity of the demos is a capacity to be stratified into interests that are not linked to an idea of separate community. The most important of these is class, but age and gender are important as well. The core idea, however, when contemplating itself, the demos is never divided into communities that can be seen as an ethnos. Ethnic cleansing is always a clash of more than one ethnos (ethnoi?—sorry, my Greek is non-existent). To arrive at ethnic cleansing, people must be in an ethnos “state of mind.”

Mann does not sufficiently explain how one travels between these two interpretive frameworks. To be fair, he does tell us quite a bit. For example, he explains that slower emergence of the nation as a result of slower integration into the world capitalist system leads to a demos self-concept, because ethnic elites can be assimilated into the ethnicity of the dominant ethnic group and slowly integrate lower classes as they become politicized (Mann, pp. 57-60). In contrast, quick integration into the world capitalist system means that ethnic elites will be “captured” by their ethnic subordinates who become politicized too quickly to permit for this slow, top-down integration into a single demos. Conservatives within the various ethnoi will stir up the mobilizing masses and create conflict (Mann, pp. 61-63). Of course, Mann is not the first to tell us this story. We can look at least as far back as Anthony Smith’s Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986) and Leah Greenfeld’s Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (1992) for different parts of this story. And Mann does not explain why individuals who are often confronted with the option of seeing group identity as ethnos or demos will pick one over the other.

The only clue we have is Thesis 2: Ethnic hostility rises where ethnicity trumps class as the main form of social stratification, in the process capturing and channeling classlike sentiments toward ethnonationalism. We know that subsuming class grievance under ethnos, makes ethnic cleansing more likely. We do not know why.

He admits that Thesis 3 does not apply to Holocaust (Mann, p. 503). He simply replies that the Holocaust is the most atypical of the cases and despite its pre-eminent coverage in the literature, should not be viewed as paradigmatic. I think a more logical approach would be to admit that in many cases, leaders must rely on forces other than coercion to gain obedience of the population and staff that are to carry out the cleansing. In the case of Nazi Germany, Hitler had created an ultra-authoritarian state that was responsive to his directives. He did not need to sell a threat anymore. It was sufficient that he believed that “subhumans” were a threat. In short, no ultra-authoritarian state is likely to fit into a paradigm, because any theoretical explanation must look at the structural constraints facing a ruler’s freedom of action. Largely unconstrained rulers, a rare phenomenon to be sure, do what they wish. If you wish to predict what the dictator of an ultra-authoritarian state will do next, you have no recourse but to study the leader.

Mann’s Policy Prescriptions

Mann is alone among those prescribing for policy with respect to preventing cleansing in combining moral sensitivity with pragmatism. His lists a number of suggestions toward the reform of the international system of collective security, the international system of justice and U.S. foreign policy priorities that he immediately admits are “pie in the sky,” (Mann, p. 526). Far more interesting is his constructive suggestion for helping reconstruct post-conflict states. He suggests combining federalism or consociationalism with features that ultimately undermine those provisos in favor of cultivating a demos. Mann argues that acquiring peace very often requires stop-gap measures that end up reinforcing ethnic identity. That said, if electoral incentives are created to undermine guarantees to varying ethnoi by making it possible for politicians to develop cross-ethnos parties that reinforce the demos, then a long-term future may be possible. Finally, Mann is frank that this problem may not survive the 21st century simply because if ethnic cleansing is simply a response to creating “nations” that “fit the states,” we may well arrive at an ethnically cleansed state system by the end of the century. His view is depressing, but realistic.

That said, his causal argument does not explain the inexorability he sees. I see the inexorability, too. I’m rather hoping that I can draw on (1) a psychological knowledge of the political deployment of rhetoric and (2) a better theory of elite action to help explain why.

Quick Notes on Staub

First, it’s always important to judge a book by its cover, so let’s consider what really counts—the title. The Roots of Evil is fairly quotidian in comparison with Chirot and McCauley’s delightfully effusive choice of Why Not Kill Them All?, but certainly it’s far catchier than anything I’ve dreamed up. Hemmingway used to leaf through the Bible to find titles when he was drawing blanks. Perhaps I’ll do the same. I wonder if I might find something creative in military memoirs? Something with blood and passion, and yet a sense of humor. Perhaps I can find something with a Desperate Housewives feel to it? Something akin to Gretchen’s splendid Better Homelands and Watchtowers.Obviously I’m not going to leave the reader uplifted; it’s just not that kind of book. That said, Shakespeare always had some comic relief in his darker tragedies, and I feel the right title might serve to punch up this otherwise morbid subject.

What would Marc Cherry do? Better, what would Bree Hodges do? That woman can slap an upbeat façade on any situation. This is exactly the sort of sensibility I need.

At any rate, we can’t dwell on aesthetics forever. Staub does have a theoretical approach that we ought to consider. He’s a psychologist. And indeed, the theory portion of the book is a fantastic review of a great deal of psych literature. I’ve pulled up a few items to read later in the day. His basic argument is that ethnic cleansing is caused when (1) the psychology of living through hard times meets (2) a culture conducive to outgroup derogation that serves to target frustration, (3) leaders willing to command the use the technique with followers sufficiently disciplined to use it and (4) a lack of external intervention.

The Psychology of Living Through Difficult Times

While Staub does mention that people must feel threatened for this technique to be used, he seems very committed to a real experience of widespread suffering for the technique to make sense. I tend to think that phrase “threat perception” works better, as I believe that clever leaders can manufacture the perception of threat where actual threat may not exist and that plain bad luck can also lead to this perception in the absence of any real threat. To Staub’s credit, he does mention threat several times. Yet, the text makes clear that is looking for “hard times” akin to his master case of Nazi Germany. Certainly, the Weimar Republic is rather well-known for its hard times. Few could imagine it an upbeat and secure environment in which to have lived. There are least, we must give him his hard times.

The idea is that people experience threat due to hard times and instinctively seek self-protection, both of the body and of the constructed self (of identity). Indeed, trauma theory gives us good reason to argue that individuals may often not only mistake the constructed self for the physical self, but actually will, on occasion, place the survival of the constructed self above the physical self (i.e. martyr themselves rather than give up their self-concept).

The types of threat that Staub is concerned with are collective threats, and it turns out that experiencing threat collectively has a dynamic that differs from experiencing threat alone. First, when one experiences threat, one becomes more pro-ingroup and have a greater need for ingroup connection. When the source of threat can be targeted to an outgroup, members of the ingroup become hostile to the outgroup. A combination of two phenomena make groups likely to support genocide. The first is “scapegoating”—a strategy of reassuring oneself of one’s own agency by blaming a convenient other for whatever bad times one is experiencing. The other is “just world thinking” in which individuals believe that the suffering of others exists because, by and large, it is deserved.

By far, his comprehensive review of elements in the psychology literature on bias and how these elements come into play during political conflict is by far the most useful contribution Staub makes. He is unique among the other authors in this literature review in his attention to the micro and macro psychological issues involved in genocide.

Culture Conducive to Outgroup Derrogation

I’m less impressed by his analysis of cultural causes of genocide. I have always disliked “cultural” analysis because many analysts who use the concept revel in its vagueness. They believe strongly that one must immerse oneself in the given culture and, once one has a feel for the culture, one can speak about it with some authority. I cannot trust this approach. I tend to prefer a clear indication of a specific norm that is causal. I want to know the genealogy of that norm and see some sort of measure of how widespread that norm might be in a given time and place. Moreover, I would like a clear indication that the norm is causal. Staub does mention that “Unproductive research approaches and excessive initial expectations have reduced interest in the notion of national character,” (p. 51) but then goes on to mention that many psychologists (Milgram, Maslow, Beatrice and John Whiting, etc.) have nonetheless found uses for culture. That said, he makes no discussion of the proper method by which norms or symbols can be isolated as a variable.

I’m afraid that this lack of sophistication shows. He likes to talk about “monolithic” as opposed to “pluralist” cultures. He conflates cultural diversity with political freedom and cultural uniformity with authoritarianism. He believes that pluralist societies are more likely to act to prevent ethnic cleansing, offering no evidence to support his claim. In his study of the Turkish genocide of the Armenians, he calls the Ottoman Empire a monolithic culture, a claim that, to be frank, is ludicrous. I am not particularly convinced that any culture is intrinsically authoritarian or, for that matter, democractic. My instinct is that his cases will find authoritarian, monolithic culture wherever he needs to find it.

Leaders Willing to Use the Technique

Staub does admit that understanding leaders is important for understanding genocide. That said, he laments that the Nuremburg trials were a missed opportunity to advance the study of the genocidal leader’s mind. His preference is to look at followers and make inferences about leaders from studying the followers. While I don’t doubt looking at antisocial behavior and “fanaticism” might help us understand leaders, he doesn’t seem concerned with looking at anything as mundane as biography. Again, here we mostly see psychological analysis of what helps individuals kill other people. I found the lit survey useful. But he never goes beyond surveying the psych literature. I anticipate that the cases are going to show a lack of historiographical sophistication.

A Lack of External Intervention

I do think that external pressure might help stop nefarious plans for genocide. That said, Staub really doesn’t offer any evidence to support this claim. He simply asserts it. He is also actively interested in creating a more caring, pluralistic world rich in “transcendence opportunities” and run by “compassionate institutions” as the solution to avoiding further genocide. Further, people should become less materialistic. The notion that even the wealthiest democracies in the world seem to have fallen short of these goals and that most of the world is not likely to witness anything like the idealized society that he describes does not seem to dawn on Staub. His grasp of the political is weak at best.

Scientific Ethical Neutrality and Moral Argument

Topics like genocide and ethnic cleansing are especially thorny ones for a social scientist to tackle. Social science as a technique rests on ethically neutral interpretation of social action. Genocide, however, is viewed ethically as a crime of the most grievous order. Presenting an ethically neutral argument about this sort of topic requires great consideration of matters of tone. Moreover, simply dropping ethical considerations is not an option. All knowledge is intended for a knower who may likely be called to act upon the knowledge the scientist provides. It seems to me unconscionable to create knowledge and not address the moral implications of that knowledge, especially on an issue of the highest moral gravity.

Yet, it seems to me equally unconscionable not to separate the tasks of the scientist and the citizen and make clear to the reader when one is engaged in the tasks appropriate to the former and when to the latter. Staub, however, does not “change hats” if you will, when speaking as scientist and citizen. This is quite clear at the beginning of the book, when he describes evil not as a question of moral intention, but rather as an empirical category, comprising “the destruction of life, dignity, happiness and the capacity to meet basic needs” (p. 25). Genocide is studied as a crime with the full presumption of the moral meaning of the act. Staub also designs his theory to maintain accountability. Evil can be found in leaders, peoples and cultures and must be found accountable in all three. He is particularly concerned with he seems to believe is the nascent desire for people in hard times to throw themselves into a totalizing identity, abdicating their individual moral accountability. I must admit, I find his moral views naïve.

On the whole then, the book is good for its psychological lit review. He makes a poor historian and a poor political scientist.